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THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
OF UTAH and IRENE W. PEAY, 
Widow of JUSTIN W. PEAY, De-
ceased, 
Defendants. 
BRIEF OF DEFENDANT 
STATEMENT OF NATURE OF CASE 
This is an original proceeding before the Supreme 
Court of Utah for the purpose of having the lawfulness 
of an Amended Order dated February 22, 1974, and final-
ized on April 15, 1974, by the Industrial Commission of 
Utah, in proceedings entitled Irene W. Peay, Widow of 
Justin W. Peay, deceased, applicant v. Kennecott Cop-
per Corporation, defendant, File No. 2U5-OD-148, in-
quired into and determined as provided by § 35-2-37, Utah 
Code Annotated, 1953, as amended. 
Case No. 
13676 
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DISPOSITION BY THE 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
On January 8, 1974, the Hearing Examiner of the 
Industrial Commission of Utah, in Claim No. 2U5-OD-148 
issued Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order 
in favor of Kennecott Copper Corporation and against 
applicant, Irene W. Peay, Widow of Justic W. Peay, 
deceased. Irene W. Peay, on January 10, 1974, filed with 
the Commission a Motion for Review and on February 22, 
1974, the Industrial Commission of Utah issued an 
Amended Order in favor of Irene W. Peay, as widow of 
Justin W. Peay, deceased. Kennecott Copper Corpora-
tion, plaintiff herein, filed with the Industrial Commission 
of Utah, on March 13, 1974, a Motion for Review of the 
February 22, 1974, Amended Order. Irene W. Peay, on 
March 14, 1974, filed, with the Industrial Commission of 
Utah, a Motion for Review of the February 22, 1974, 
Amended Order, with respect to the amount of burial 
benefits awarded. The Motions for Review were denied 
by Order entered by the Industrial Commission of Utah 
on April 15, 1974. Plaintiff filed this action with the 
Supreme Court of Utah on April 25, 1974. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON REVIEW 
Defendant, Irene Peay, widow of Justin Peay, de-
ceased, upon this review, seeks to have affirmed so much 
of the Amended Order issued by the Industrial Commis-
sion on February 22, 1974, as grants burial benefits to 
defendant and seeks to have reversed so much of the 
same order as grants only $450.00 burial expenses. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Defendant agrees with plaintiff's statement of the 
facts, but would add the following: 
1. Defendant, Irene W. Peay, made application to 
the Industrial Commission, seeking payment of burial 
benefits, pursuant to Section 35-2-15(10), Utah Code 
Ann. 1953, the 1971 Amendment of Section 35-2-15 (e), 
Utah Code Ann. 1953. 
2. The occupational disease, silicosis, was found, on 
the evidence by the Hearing Examiner of the Industrial 
Commission, to be a substantial factor contributing to 
the death of Justin Peay. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
SECTION 35-2-15(10), UTAH CODE ANNO-
TATED 1953, AS AMENDED, GRANTS THE 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
THE LEGAL AUTHORITY TO MAKE AN 
AWARD OF BURIAL EXPENSES TO THE 
D E F E N D A N T , AS WIDOW OF JUSTIN 
PEAY, DECEASED, WHO DIED AS THE 
RESULT OF AN OCCUPATIONAL DISEASE 
CONTRACTED WHILE IN THE EMPLOY-
MENT OF THE PLAINTIFF. 
A. THE CLEAR LANGUAGE OF SECTION 
35-2-15(10), UTAH CODE ANN. 1953, 
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PROVIDES AN EXCEPTION TO THE 
LIMITS AND RESTRICTIONS OF SEC-
TION 35-2-13 (b) (3), UTAH CODE ANN. 
1953, GIVING THE INDUSTRIAL COM-
MISSION THE POWER TO AWARD 
BURIAL EXPENSES TO THE DEFEN-
DANT, IRENE W. PEAY. 
The Hearing Examiner for the Industrial Commis-
sion found, from the evidence, that silicosis was a suffi-
cient cause of the death of Justin Peay, that he was com-
pensable under the Occuipational Disease Act. This was 
sufficient for the Industrial Commission to later make 
an award of burial expenses under Section 35-2-15(10), 
Utah Code Ann. 1953. That section reads, in part: 
The benefit to which a disabled employee 
or his dependents shall be entitled under this 
act . . . are to be limited as follows: * * * 
(10) In case death results from such oc-
cupational disease the employer shall pay not 
to exceed $1,000 burial expenses. 
The only requirement for an award of burial expenses in 
the Occupational Disease Act is that the employee die 
from the specified occupational disease. 
It is the position of the plaintiff that the Industrial 
Commission erred in awarding burial expenses, because 
of the language of Section 35-2-13 (b) (3), Utah Code Ann. 
1953, which reads: 
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(b) There is imposed upon every em-
ployer a liability for the payment of compensa-
tion to the dependents of every employee in 
cases where death results from an occupational 
disease, subject to the following conditions: * * * 
(3) No compensation shall be paid for 
death from silicosis unless the death results 
within three years from the last day upon which 
the employee actually worked for the employer 
against whom compensation is claimed, except: 
(a) in those cases where death results during 
a period of continuous total disability from sili-
cosis for which compensation has been paid or 
awarded, or (b) in those cases where death re-
sults from silicosis complicated by active tubercu-
losis and such silico-tuberculosis is evidence by 
positive laboratory sputum tests and X-rays 
and other clinical findings, and in such cases com-
pensation shall be paid if such death results 
within five years from the last day upon which 
the employee actually worked for the employer 
against whom compensation is claimed. 
The plaintiff relies heavily on the phrase "no compensa-
tion/' in the above statute, as including the burial bene-
fits provided for in Section 35-2-15(10), but it is the con-
tention of the defendant that compensation, as used in 
Section 35-2-13 (b) (3), does not include burial benefits. 
The Industrial Commission stated, in the Carl E. 
Pettersson case, No. 2U5-OD-140, Commission Order of 
July 9, 1969, that reference to compensation in Section 
35-2-13 (b) (3) is not synonymous or applicable to the 
term burial expense, as used in Section 35-2-15 (e), which 
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is now Section 35-2-15(10). With regard to administra-
tive interpretations such as these, the Utah Supreme 
Court has held them to have significant persuasive weight 
in administrative appeals. Kennecott Copper Corpora-
tion v. Anderson, 30 Utah 2d 102, 514 P. 2d 217 (1973). 
It is true that Section 35-2-12 (b) defines "compen-
sation" as the payments and benefits provided for in the 
Act, but according to Anderson, supra, this is not a final 
determination as to the use of the term "compensation" 
in a given section. In that case, Anderson was injured 
on May 5, 1959, while in the employ of Kennecott, suf-
fering third degree burns on his legs, requiring extensive 
grafting and hospitalization. On January 28, 1961, he 
was given a lump sum award of 20% loss of bodily func-
tion. In September of 11362, the case was reopened, and 
he was awarded additional compensation and medical 
expenses covering from March 7, 1963, to May 12, 1963. 
In 1968, five years after the foregoing treatment and nine 
years after the original accident, because of ulceration 
on his left leg, he applied for further compensation and 
medical expenses. Kennecott interposed the defense of 
the statute of limitation of six years set forth in Section 
35-1-66, Utah Code Ann. 1953. The Supreme Court af-
firmed, in part, and reversed, in part. It held that the 
statute that imposed a six-year limitation on "compen-
sation" did not affect the payment of medical and hos-
pital expenses after the six-year period. Yet, the defini-
tion of "compensation" for Section 35-1-66, Utah Code 
Ann. 1953 (the Workmen's Compensation Act), is the 
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same as quoted above for the Occupational Disease Act 
and is found in Section 35-1-44(6), Utah Code Ann. 1953. 
Therefore, the precedent is that these general statutes 
of limitations, which speak generally of compensation, 
do not include all instances where benefits are paid. 
The plaintiff cites Pacific States Cast Iron Pipe 
Co. v. Industrial Commission, 118 Utah 46, 218 P. 2d 
970 (1950), where burial expenses were not allowed in 
a decision that disallowed all death benefits because the 
employee's death occurred after the statutory limit. We 
would distinguish that case on the grounds that the 
present issue was not argued before the court, nor did 
the court comment on the difference between the statutes 
which are in issue here. In addition, the principles of 
Anderson, discussed herein, overruled any authority on 
this issue from the Pacific States Cast Iron Pipe case. 
Anderson also overrules the plaintiff's reasoning that 
medical, hospital, and burial benefits always are included 
within the term "compensation", as the plaintiff argued 
from Silver King Coalition Mines Co., 2 Utah 2d 1, 268 P. 
2d 689 (1954), and Henrie v. Rocky Mountain Packing 
Corporation, 113 Utah 415, 196 P. 2d 487 (1948). 
It is true that the Anderson case is an interpretation 
from Workmen's Compensation Laws, but the Utah Su-
preme Court has held the Workmen's Compensation Law 
and the Occupational Disease Act to be closely related; 
and that language from the Workmen's Compensation 
Act was used in the Occupational Disease Act, making 
it possible to rely on interpretations of similar language 
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in the Workmen's Compensation Laws for a determina-
tion of the intents, purposes and objectives of the Occu-
pational Disease Act. Masich v. United States Smelting, 
Refining & Mining Co., et al., 113 Utah 101, 108, 191 P. 
2nd 612 (1948). 
The Utah Supreme Court has also stated in Ander-
son, supra at 105, that: 
It is often said that it should be assumed 
that all of the words used in a statute were used 
advisedly and were intended to be given mean-
ing and effect. For the same reasons, the omis-
sions should likewise be taken note of and given 
effect. Anderson, supra, at 105. 
Therefore, it is significant that Section 35-2-13 (b) (3) 
omits the phrase "burial expenses", and Section 35-2-
15(10) expressly uses the phrase. It is clear that the 
legislature intended to provide this as an exception to 
the limitation placed on death benefits in Section 35-2-
13 (b) (3). Also apparent is the omission of any time 
restriction in Section 35-2-15(10), Utah Code Ann. 1953. 
The Supreme Court of Utah indicated, in the Ander-
son case, at 106, that one of the reasons for extending 
medical benefits past the limitation period was the like-
lihood that Mr. Anderson would need medical and hos-
pital benefits after the 6-year period. By awarding burial 
expenses in the Occupational Disease Act, without a time 
limitation, the legislature is using the same reasoning 
to indicate that it is likely that the employee will die 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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from the occupational disease; and, if he does, burial bene-
fits will be provided. 
There is an opposite assumption for the Workmen's 
Compensation Laws. If the employee does not die from 
the injury within a given period, the presumption is that 
he will not die from the injury; and, as a result, burial 
benefits are denied after the statutory period (Section 
35-1-68, Utah Code Ann. 1953). 
The Supreme Court of Utah has stated that the pur-
pose of the compensation laws is: 
"To substitute a more humanitarian and 
economical system of compensation for injured 
workmen or their dependents in case of death 
which the more humane and moral conception 
of our time requires," and that such acts are 
"intended to afford injured industrial workmen 
or their dependants simple, adequate, and speedy 
means of securing compensation, to the end that 
the 'cost of human wreckage may be taxed against 
the industry which employs it' and that society 
be relieved of the support of unfortunate vic-
tims of industrial accidents." It is further stated 
that "If there is any doubt 'respecting the right 
to compensation, such doubt should be resolved 
in favor of the employee or of his dependents as 
the case may be/ " citing Chandler v. Industrial 
Com., 55 Utah 213, 184 P. 1020, 8 A. L. R. 930. 
Barber Asphalt Corporation v. Industrial Com-
mission, et al.9 103 Utah 371, 378-379, 135 P. 2d 
266, 270 (1943). 
It is far better that the cost of injury from occupational 
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disease be paid as provided by compensation laws rather 
than denying benefits to those in need and transferring 
the burden to other forms of social legislation, such as 
public welfare. It is oppressive to place the burden of 
burial expenses on an employee's surviving dependents, 
when his death results from an occupational disease. 
We submit that the purposes of the Occupational 
Disease Act, the plain language of Section 35-2-15(10), 
the particular problems facing families whose members 
contract an occupational disease and the Utah Supreme 
Court's rule that the "Workmen's Compensation Act 
should be liberally construed in favor of the employee or 
his dependents, (citing cases)" — Silver King Coalition 
Mines Co. v. Industrial Commission, 2 Utah 2d 1, 7, 268 
P. 2d 689 (1954) — support the order of the Industrial 
Commission of February 22, 1974, awarding burial bene-
fits to defendant, as widow of Justin W. Peay, deceased. 
POINT II. 
SECTION 35-2-15(10), UTAH CODE ANNO-
TATED 1953, AS AMENDED, ALLOWS THE 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION TO MAKE AN 
AWARD OF $1,000.00 INSTEAD OF THE 
$450.00 THE COMMISSION AWARDED TO 
DEFENDANT IN THE AMENDED ORDER 
ENTERED ON FEBRUARY 22, 1974. 
A. UTAH SUPREME COURT DECISIONS 
SUPPORT DEFENDANTS POSITION 
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THAT THE 1971 AMENDMENT TO 35-
2-15(10), U. C. A. 1953, WHICH ALLOWS 
$1,000.00 FOR BURIAL EXPENSES IS 
THE CONTROLLING STATUTE IN 
THIS CASE RATHER THAN THE LAW 
IN EFFECT IN 1956 AT WHICH TIME 
THE DEFENDANT'S DECEASED WAS 
LAST IN THE EMPLOYMENT OF THE 
PLAINTIFF. 
The Industrial Commission of Utah awarded Irene 
W. Peay $450.00 burial benefits for the death of her hus-
band Justin W. Peay. It did so because that was the law 
in effect at the time the deceased left the employment 
of the plaintiff on disability. It is the position of the de-
fendant that the Industrial Commission erred in restrict-
ing its award to the law in effect in 1956, and should 
have made the award of burial benefits as provided by 
the 1971 amendment, which was the law in effect at the 
time of Mr. Peay's death. 
The Supreme Court of Utah has accepted the rule 
that the law in effect at the time of death is controlling 
with respect to death benefits. Quoting 58 Am. Jur., 
Workmen's Compensation, § 73, the court said: 
"With respect to time, the right to compen-
sation for an injury, under the workmen's com-
pensation acts is governed, in the absence of any 
provision to the contrary, by the law in force at 
the time of the occurrence of such injury. This 
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rule is applicable to the rights of relatives or 
dependents of a deceased employee, in so far as 
they are predicated upon the survival of the 
rights of the employee. But where the statute 
confers upon the dependents a new and indepen-
dent right to compensation on account of his 
death, it is generally held that the right to such 
compensation is governed by the law in force 
at the time of death rather than at the time of 
injury, when the two events are separated in 
time." Silver King Coalition Mines Co., supra, 
at 4. 
In that case an amendment which increased the 
opportunity of dependents to apply for death benefits was 
passed during the period between the time the decedent 
left employment on disability and the time of his death. 
The court held (p. 4) that there were two rights of action 
created by the Occupational Disease Act, one in the 
employee and one in his dependents, (pp. 5 and 6) that 
the right of action in the dependents did not occur until 
the death of the employee, and (pp. 4-6) therefore the 
statute in effect at the occurrence of the contingency 
creating the right of action was controlling. The court 
awarded death benefits, giving effect to the new amend-
ment. 
Likewise, by a 1971 amendment, burial benefits were 
increased to $1,000.00, and since Mr. Peay died in 1973 
after the effective date of the statute on July 1, 1971, his 
award should not have been restricted to $450.00, which 
was the statutory amount in 1956. 
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Further, the court reasoned that (p. 5) giving effect 
to an amendment in that case was not making the law 
retroactive, and that (p. 6) the duties of the employer 
are not frozen at the time of last employment or injury. 
The purposes of compensation laws would also require 
the more recent amendment to be given effect. As quoted 
earlier, that purpose in brief is to relieve the burden 
caused by an employee's injury or death. Of the expenses 
at death, burial expenses can be the most burdensome, 
and the legislature has recognized this by not only pro-
viding a special section establishing burial benefits, as 
argued earlier, but also increasing the amounts regularly 
to meet the needs of increasing expenses in this area. Mr. 
Peay was buried in 1973, at 1973 expenses. It is only 
reasonable and just that the more recent statutory amend-
ment be given effect to meet the burden caused by the 
death of Mr. Peay. 
CONCLUSION 
Defendants respectfully submit that the award of 
burial expenses to defendant Irene W. Peay, widow of 
Justin W. Peay, deceased, issued by the defendant In-
dustrial Commission of Utah in its Amended Order of 
February 22, 1974, was justified by the provisions of 
35-2-15(10), Uttah Code Annotated 1953, as amended. 
The defendant Irene W. Peay further submits that 
the proper award for burial expenses should be controlled 
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by the 197} amendment to 35-2-15(10), Utah Code Anno-
tated 1953, and the Industrial Commission should not 
have been restricted to the law as it was in effect in 1956. 
Respectfully submitted, 
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